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Monitoring hedge funds:




Investor inﬂ  ows into hedge funds have been signiﬁ  cant in recent years and they have continued unabated. 
As a result, the presence and role of these investment funds in global capital markets have become 
increasingly important, and to a much greater extent than the amount of capital they manage would suggest. 
This is because hedge funds can, and often do, leverage their investment positions. Indeed, their leveraged 
assets are sometimes comparable with the assets of large banks. The growing and active participation of 
hedge funds in a large number of ﬁ  nancial markets implies that the functioning of these markets could be 
seriously affected if the hedge fund sector came under stress.
The positive contribution of hedge funds to the efﬁ  ciency and liquidity of global ﬁ  nancial markets is widely 
recognised, but there are also concerns that in times of stress their activities may create risks to ﬁ  nancial 
stability. The lack of transparency and limited publicly available information about their balance sheets 
and activities poses signiﬁ  cant challenges for ﬁ  nancial stability analysis. While it is possible to base such 
an analysis on a multitude of information sources on hedge fund activities – including dedicated ﬁ  nancial 
media, commercial hedge fund databases, quarterly industry reports, hedge fund return indices, academic 
studies, some supervisory data and market surveillance – these sources are not sufﬁ  cient for an adequate 
monitoring and robust evaluation of hedge fund activities from a ﬁ  nancial stability perspective.
Three groups of indicators could be important for ﬁ  nancial stability analysis, namely those which shed light 
on banks’ exposures to hedge funds, provide yardsticks of the crowding of hedge fund trades, and facilitate 
the gauging of endogenous hedge fund vulnerabilities. The latter group would include the measures of 
funding liquidity risk, leverage and exposures to market risk factors. The construction of all these indicators 
would be greatly facilitated if basic information on hedge fund balance sheets were available. Since this is 
not the case, various indirect estimation methods have to be relied upon.
A “desirable vs. available” analysis reveals the most important information gaps, but it does not aim at 
providing recommendations on how to enhance hedge fund transparency in practice. Instead, it proposes 
three elements which a transparency framework would ideally include: ﬁ  rst, more aggregate information 
to all market participants; second, a highly standardised reporting template that would make disclosures 
more effective; ﬁ  nally, adequate information for a joint analysis of the aggregate activities of banks, hedge 
funds and other highly leveraged institutions in order to have a comprehensive picture of risks to the smooth 
functioning of ﬁ  nancial markets.
NB:  The author would like to thank Tomas Garbaravičius of the ECB’s Directorate Financial Stability and Supervision for his valuable assistance in preparing this contribution.ARTICLES
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I
n the public mind, hedge funds are often linked 
with three things: extraordinary investment 
returns (associated with sophisticated and 
potentially highly leveraged investment strategies 
exploiting market inefﬁ  ciencies), non-transparent 
offshore investment activities, and spectacular 
occasional incidents such as the near-collapse of 
LTCM in September 1998. In other words, they are 
often described as investment funds which take on 
high risk but offer the potential for commensurately 
high returns, and achieve this in highly opaque 
ways. There is little doubt that they have grown in 
importance in recent years, not least because as a 
group they have become one of the largest alternative 
investment vehicles and an increasingly dominant 
force in many ﬁ  nancial markets..
There is a broad consensus that hedge funds, as highly 
active and ﬂ  exible ﬁ  nancial market participants, 
contribute signiﬁ  cantly to the efﬁ  ciency and liquidity 
of the various ﬁ  nancial markets in which they trade. 
At the same time, there are also concerns that their 
activities may, under certain circumstances, create 
risks to the stability of ﬁ  nancial systems. These 
concerns are further compounded by the fact that 
there is little transparency about the activities 
of hedge funds. This makes the monitoring and 
assessment of their activities a difﬁ  cult task and 
leaves public authorities and market participants in an 
uncomfortable position. Against this background, this 
article aims at shedding more light on how potential 
risks to ﬁ  nancial stability posed by hedge funds could 
be monitored given the public information which is 
currently available, and it also attempts to identify 
the main information gaps hindering such efforts.
The article is structured as follows. Section  1| 
describes the main characteristics of hedge funds 
and compares the total amount of capital under 
management within the industry with the size of 
other groups of ﬁ  nancial intermediaries. Section 2| 
considers the positive and possible negative effects of 
hedge fund activities on the ﬁ  nancial system, while 
Section 3| reviews the main  information sources that 
are publicly available and can be used to monitor the 
emergence and evolution of potential risks to ﬁ  nancial 
system stability, and explains the most important 
features, advantages and limitations of these sources. 
Section 4| proposes three main groups of indicators 
which could be useful for ﬁ  nancial  stability 
monitoring and discusses practical challenges that 
can arise in constructing these indicators, including 
the availability of relevant information and possible 
indirect estimation methods. Section 5| summarises 
the outcome of a “desirable vs. available” analysis 
by highlighting the main information gaps, which 
complicate the effective conduct of a more robust 
surveillance and evaluation of hedge fund activities 
from a ﬁ  nancial stability perspective, and it also 
considers several possible ways to address them.
1| T HE SIZE
OF THE HEDGE FUND INDUSTRY
A starting point for gauging the size of any industry 
is usually a fairly precise deﬁ  nition of the activities 
of the ﬁ  rms comprising that industry. In the case of 
hedge funds this is not a straightforward task. There 
is no generally accepted and reasonably accurate 
deﬁ  nition of what a hedge fund is. Broadly speaking, 
hedge funds represent a relatively unconstrained 
form of active investment management and a 
versatile business model.1 Indeed, hedge funds 
have ﬂ  exible investment mandates, usually with 
relatively few, if any, constraints on leverage, 
short-selling and traded assets, and they enjoy 
or are structured to beneﬁ  t from tax advantages 
and minimum regulatory intervention. The 
uncertainty about the precise deﬁ  ning features 
of a hedge fund is further magniﬁ   ed by the 
self-declaration principle: essentially any fund 
would be considered a hedge fund if its managers 
were to market it as such, although it would be very 
unusual if the fund managers were not to charge 
performance fees in addition to management 
fees. Moreover, some hedge fund managers have 
additional capital under management in private 
managed accounts2 that are run in parallel with 
their hedge funds, and there are plenty of other 
investors, including the proprietary desks of large 
banks, which pursue strategies substantially similar 
to hedge funds. Thus, the pool of hedge fund-like 
capital available that can be leveraged and quickly 
deployed is far larger than the amounts managed 
in legal hedge fund structures would indicate.
1  Alfred Winslow Jones, a sociologist and journalist, is often credited with being a founder of one of the ﬁ  rst hedge funds in 1949. Jones’s fund used leverage and 
short-selling to hedge its stock portfolio against broader market movements.
2  According to Tremont Capital Management, hedge fund managers ran about USD 325 billion in private managed accounts at the end of June 2005.ARTICLES
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Notwithstanding these conceptual challenges, 
statisticians around the world have been discussing 
how to deﬁ  ne hedge funds for statistical reporting 
purposes and are expected to come up with some 
workable deﬁ  nitions. Currently, there are at least 
two such initiatives: one by the ECB and the other 
by the IMF. However, it cannot be excluded that the 
rapid convergence of hedge funds and traditional 
investment funds, which are increasingly adopting 
ﬂ  exible hedge fund-like strategies, may render such 
deﬁ  nitions obsolete sooner than expected.
A consequence of these difﬁ  culties, together with the 
relative opaqueness of the hedge fund sector, is that 
estimates of the size of the industry vary considerably. 
Most estimates are based on information collected by 
commercial hedge fund databases, although these 
are often supplemented by data on funds tracked 
internally by database managers. By early 2007, 
several data providers indicated that, on the basis of 
joint internal and commercially distributed hedge 
fund data samples, the total capital under management 
by single-manager hedge funds globally was rapidly 
approaching the USD 1.5 trillion mark.3 Moreover, 
in addition to numbers derived from these sources, 
some other reported ﬁ  gures include estimates of 
additional amounts for which reliable information 
is difﬁ  cult to come by. Other approaches which 
are used to gauge the size of the sector combine 
information from several commercial databases4
or information derived from surveys of hedge fund 
administrators.5 Given the range of estimates, it is 
always useful to cross-check them and bear in mind 
the different methods used to construct them.
A comparison of capital under management of 
single-manager hedge funds with equivalent measures 
for other institutional investors would suggest that 
the global hedge fund industry still appears rather 
small (see Table 1). However, the lack of information 
on hedge fund leveraged assets makes it impossible to 
compare the overall asset size of hedge funds with that 
of other highly leveraged institutions, such as banks. 
The total leveraged assets of an individual hedge fund 
can sometimes be quite signiﬁ  cant and comparable 
with the size of some systemically important banks, 
3  According to Lipper TASS and Hedge Fund Research estimates, at the end of 2006 the total capital under management globally by hedge funds was respectively 
USD 1.05 trillion and USD 1.43 trillion.
4  See Strategic Financial Solutions (2006). This study, which is conducted annually, is based on data from 12 commercial hedge fund databases. At the end of 2005, 
it dentiﬁ  ed 6,900 single-manager hedge funds (excluding commodity trading advisers and managed futures funds) and roughly 3,600 funds of hedge funds worldwide, 
managing in total nearly USD 1.35 trillion and around USD 0.7 trillion respectively.
5  See Hedge Fund Manager Week (2006). According to the hedge fund administrators surveyed, the total value of single-manager hedge fund assets under administration 
was almost USD 2.1 trillion at the end of October 2006, up from USD 1.37 trillion at the end of October 2005. However, it has not been precisely deﬁ  ned whether 
the assets held by administrators are equal to the hedge funds’ net asset value, or whether they also include debt-funded assets.
Table 1
Size of selected institutional investors and ﬁ  nancial asset markets globally
December 2005
USD billions % of world GDP Indicator Source
Hedge fundsa) 1,350 3 Capital under management Strategic Financial Solutions
Open-end investment funds 17,771 40 Net assets
European Funds and Asset Management 
Association
Pension funds 18,569 42 Investments International Financial Services, London
Banks (OECD)b) 2,906 7 Shareholders’ equity Bureau Van Dijk (Bankscope)
Total of the above 40,596 91
Insurance companiesc) 14,500 33 Invested assets International Financial Services, London
Banks (OECD)b) 53,552 120 Assets Bureau Van Dijk (Bankscope)
Stock market capitalisation 37,168 84 International Monetary Fund
Debt securities 58,949 133 International Monetary Fund
Bank deposits 38,000 85 McKinsey Global Institute
World GDP 44,446 100 Nominal GDP International Monetary Fund
Notes: The terms capital under management, net assets and assets under management are usually used interchangeably and they are equivalent to shareholders’ equity, 
whereas the term (gross) assets or investments include investments that may have been ﬁ  nanced by debt. Open-end investment funds and pension funds have restrictions 
on the use of leverage and, therefore, their assets/investments should be close to net assets.
a) Single-manager.
b) OECD commercial banks and holding companies, consolidated. The IMF estimated that the assets of all banks worldwide were equal to USD 55,673 billion in 2005.
c) 2004 data, life and non-life.ARTICLES
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6  As another example, at the end of August 2006 the total gross assets of Citadel, a large multi-strategy hedge fund that was the ﬁ  rst to issue a hedge fund bond in 
December 2006, were reported to be USD 166 billion, or more than 12 times larger than its net assets of USD 13 billion.
7  See, for example, Greenwich Associates (2006).
8  Researchers from the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) using micro trading data found that managed futures hedge funds can dampen rather 
than increase volatility in energy markets by providing market liquidity to other market participants. See Haigh, Hranaiova and Overdahl (2005).
9  See Brown and Spitzer (2006).
as was exempliﬁ  ed by the size of LTCM positions at 
the time of its near-failure.6 The total single-manager 
hedge fund capital under management, however, is 
close to half of bank shareholders’ equity worldwide, 
although it is dwarfed by the capital entrusted to 
traditional investment funds.
What is more important, however, is that such 
comparisons, even if they were possible on a 
leveraged basis, do not capture the true inﬂ  uence 
of hedge funds on trading volumes and market 
liquidity. This is because hedge funds tend to change 
their portfolio composition much more frequently 
than other market participants. According to some 
market surveys, hedge funds increasingly account 
for signiﬁ  cant shares of trading volumes in various 
cash and derivatives markets and their presence 
is crucial for the burgeoning market for credit 
derivatives, where they account for more than 55% 
of the total credit derivatives trading volume.7
2| I MPACT ON FINANCIAL STABILITY
The magnitude of systemic risk, both in absolute 
and relative terms, posed by hedge fund activities 
is difﬁ  cult to assess owing to the lack of sufﬁ  cient 
publicly available information about their balance 
sheets and trading activities. Moreover, any systemic 
risk assessment is further complicated by the 
diversity of hedge funds and the multitude of factors 
that may affect individual and collective hedge fund 
behaviour under different market conditions. It is 
very likely that under normal market conditions 
the balance between positive and possible negative 
effects on ﬁ  nancial system stability would prove 
to be positive. Nonetheless, it cannot be excluded 
that  active risk-taking by hedge fund managers may 
have prolonged recent benign market conditions 
and contributed to the build-up of so far invisible 
vulnerabilities within the ﬁ  nancial system, which 
could unravel in unexpected ways in the event of 
an adverse market shock.
Positive effects of active hedge fund investment 
strategies are widely acknowledged. They include 
improved market liquidity,8 enhanced price 
discovery processes and an increased ﬂ  ow  of 
ﬁ  nancial innovations, which may all contribute to 
the stability of ﬁ  nancial markets. In addition, hedge 
funds presumably provide more diversiﬁ  cation 
opportunities for investors and thereby foster more 
complete markets. There is some evidence, however, 
of a high correlation between the returns of at least 
some hedge fund strategies and the substantial 
negative price movements in major equity and bond 
markets, which reduces potential diversiﬁ  cation 
beneﬁ  ts.9
In their quest for higher returns, hedge funds also 
tend to assume risks which more regulated ﬁ  nancial 
institutions are usually reluctant to be exposed to and, 
more importantly, they may be willing to provide risk 
capital in volatile market conditions or when there is 
a risk of looming stressed conditions, as evidenced by 
the acquisition of substantial parts of the Amaranth 
Advisors investment portfolio in September 2006. 
However, this very valuable stabilising inﬂ  uence 
is conditional upon the availability of sufﬁ  cient 
liquidity buffers when needed and the absence of 
highly-leveraged crowded or concentrated one-way 
bets across the hedge fund sector.
The possible simultaneous exit of hedge funds from 
concentrated investment positions is probably the 
main way through which hedge funds could adversely 
impact on the liquidity and price volatility of affected 
ﬁ  nancial markets, particularly of small and illiquid 
ones. Nevertheless, the risk of crowded trades is a 
more general risk to smooth market functioning, 
which can also be associated with the activities of 
other market participants, and, therefore, it is not 
conﬁ  ned to hedge funds.
Other possible negative effects on ﬁ  nancial stability 
could materialise through banks’ exposures to 
hedge funds. Banks’ direct exposures comprise 
credit (ﬁ   nancing and trading) and investment 
exposures, and it is very important that banks, as 
key counterparties, prudently manage them. Several 
reports have noted signiﬁ  cant improvements in the 
way banks manage their exposures to hedge fund 
clients, but, nevertheless, important challenges ARTICLES
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remain.10 Furthermore, the progress made in the 
management of such exposures may be uneven 
across prime broker banks. The same applies to 
hedge fund managers, as one recent survey of hedge 
funds’ risk management practices highlighted quite 
a few important shortcomings.11
There are also some indications that intense 
competition among banks for the lucrative hedge 
fund servicing business could have led to some 
dilution of the credit standards applied, particularly 
with respect to margin terms, thereby diminishing 
the effectiveness of the counterparty discipline 
exercised by banks. Moreover, investor demand for 
some of the better hedge funds remains strong and, 
therefore, investors may not always be in a position 




The ECB, as well as other central banks, is unable to 
monitor the activities of hedge funds through its own 
regular statistical data collection activities, not least 
because hedge funds are  predominantly domiciled 
offshore. More generally, the statistical information 
collected by public institutions is increasingly 
inadequate and a greater reliance on commercial 
information sources is becoming more common and 
even inevitable. However, commercially available 
information is based on voluntary reporting by 
contributors and this can lead to deﬁ  cient and 
non-uniform coverage, and can impair the timeliness 
and quality of such information. Nevertheless, there 
is a range of available information sources on hedge 
fund activities, including dedicated ﬁ  nancial media, 
commercial hedge fund databases, quarterly industry 
reports, hedge fund return indices, academic papers, 
some supervisory data and market surveillance.
The rapid expansion of the hedge fund sector has 
spurred the development of a wide spectrum of 
dedicated ﬁ  nancial media, which includes magazines, 
websites and newsletters covering the latest news 
as well as more analytical reports about the industry. 
These sources of information are complemented by 
conferences and other specialised events, the main 
purpose of which, besides discussing broader and 
speciﬁ  c hedge fund-related issues, is to provide 
networking opportunities that bring hedge fund 
managers and investors together. There are also 
plenty of market surveys of investors, hedge fund 
managers, and prime brokers focusing on their 
preferences, expectations,12 risk management 
practices13 and other topical issues. All of these 
pieces of public information provide glimpses of 
the bigger mosaic and are useful for improving our 
understanding of the hedge fund sector and of the 
conjunctural developments associated with it, but 
they do not provide a sufﬁ  cient information basis 
for ﬁ  nancial stability analysis.
The commercially available hedge fund databases are 
one of the most important sources of quantitative 
and qualitative information about hedge funds. 
Currently there are at least 12 databases with 
partially overlapping samples. Hedge fund managers 
report information to databases mainly for marketing 
purposes and this voluntary reporting leads to 
various data biases, of which the most obvious are 
survivorship, incubation (backﬁ  ll or instant history), 
self-selection and liquidation biases.14 In these 
databases, only monthly returns on investors’ capital 
and capital under management are reported as time 
series.15 All other information is static either by its 
nature (e.g. on redemption frequency, inception 
date) or due to infrequent updating without tracking 
of changes made (e.g. on average and maximum 
leverage). Both the time series data on capital under 
management and hedge fund returns are available 
with time lags, and the ﬁ  rst time series are also less 
complete than return data. This is illustrated in 
Chart 1, where the lines indicating the number of 
funds reporting data for capital under management 
10  See, for example, ECB (2005).
11  See Deloitte (2007).
12  See, for example, Deutsche Bank (2007).
13  See, for example, Mercer Oliver Wyman (2006) or Deloitte (2007).
14  Survivorship bias arises if defunct funds are excluded from an analysis. Incubation bias refers to the fact that only funds that experience good historical returns 
and survive the incubation period are likely to join databases and to backﬁ  ll the whole or part of their instant history of returns. Self-selection bias arises due to the 
voluntary nature of hedge fund reporting, which makes the sample of hedge funds in a database unrepresentative of the universe of hedge funds. Liquidation bias 
occurs because disappearing funds may not report the ﬁ  nal periods leading up to and including their liquidation.
15  Time series of investor net ﬂ  ows can be derived from the time series of hedge fund returns and capital under management.ARTICLES
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at any given point in time in two different versions 
of the database are always below the lines showing 
the number of funds reporting return data. The lines 
taper off at the end of the sample because of lagged 
reporting, the impact of which however disappears 
after several months. Chart 1 also indicates that the 
aggregate historical information obtained from a 
database will vary depending on the version used, 
since historical and contemporaneous fund-speciﬁ  c 
information is added, deleted or modiﬁ  ed in the 
database continuously.
Combining information from all available hedge 
fund databases is possible in principle, but quite 
complicated in practice. Moreover, even if such 
work were to be initiated, it would not be possible 
to distribute results to a wider audience of outside 
users on a frequent basis due to non-competition 
clauses in database user licence agreements.
There might be several ways to overcome the fact that 
most information in commercial databases is static 
and thus to obtain some insight into the evolution of a 
chosen indicator over time. First, one could aggregate 
hedge fund information by the year when a fund 
joined the database or by the fund’s inception year 
and then compare whether older or younger funds 
tend to have different properties, in order to interpret 
differences as a weak sign of possible changes of an 
indicator over time, particularly if hedge funds tend 
to provide their static information only at the time of 
joining the database. Second, if static information is 
modiﬁ  ed infrequently or should be invariable by its 
nature, then its evolution over time could be estimated 
by aggregating information on funds which reported 
their return or capital under management data at 
various points in time. However, if hedge funds tend to 
update relevant information relatively frequently, time 
series of particular static indicators could be created by 
analysing differences in various versions of a database, 
and this could be the third way of tackling the static 
nature of most data in hedge fund databases.
As mentioned above, many database managers track 
internally more funds than those that are included 
in the commercial versions of their databases. This 
broader set of joint commercially available and 
internal information is often presented in their 
quarterly industry reports,16 which contain aggregate 
quarterly data on capital under management and 
investor net ﬂ  ows by strategy. Given the larger 
underlying samples used to produce these reports, 
data in such reports are preferred to a simple 
aggregation of the information available in any 
one database and are generally used by market 
participants as a primary source of basic information 
on broad developments in the hedge fund sector.
The same broader datasets are used to create various 
monthly non-investable hedge fund indices, intended to 
track the overall sector performance and the average 
returns of speciﬁ  c hedge fund investment strategies. 
However, various index providers use different 
samples, investment strategy categories, eligibility 
rules and weighting schemes. As a result, even 
for the same (or very similar) investment strategy 
there are signiﬁ   cant coverage and performance 
differences, which complicate the choice of an index 
for analysis purposes.17 Some non-investable indices 
have investable versions, some of which report hedge 
fund returns more frequently than monthly, but 
these investable indices tend to underperform non-
investable ones due to stricter eligibility rules and 
looser investor redemption terms, which prevent 
funds included in the investable index from investing 
in less liquid assets.
16  See, for example, Lipper TASS (2007) or Hedge Fund Research (2007).
17  Owing to this, the EDHEC Risk and Asset Management Research Centre has suggested using the ﬁ  rst principal component of various competing indices for the 
same investment strategy. See EDHEC Risk and Asset Management Research Centre (2004).
Chart 1
Number of funds with return and capital 
under management data at various points 
in time in two different versions of the database
December 1993 – January 2007












Number of return data, 14 January 2007 version
Number of return data, 27 September 2006 version
Number of CuM data, 14 January 2007 version
Number of CuM data, 27 September 2006 version
Source: Lipper TASS database (27 September 2006 and 14 January 2007 versions).
Note: CuM stands for capital under management. Single-manager hedge funds and 
funds of hedge funds. Only funds which reported monthly net of all fees returns.ARTICLES
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During this decade, the number of academic papers on 
hedge funds has been increasing exponentially and 
they could provide useful indicators for monitoring 
and analysing hedge fund activities from a ﬁ  nancial 
stability perspective. However, the bulk of academic 
research has tended to focus on an analysis of hedge 
fund returns,18 capital under management and 
investor net ﬂ  ows, since only these data are available 
as time series in hedge fund databases. There have 
been relatively few publications concentrating 
on ﬁ  nancial stability issues, but their number is 
growing. The authors of such papers analyse hedge 
fund liquidations,19 activities during various crisis 
episodes,20 the co-movement of hedge fund returns 
during periods of stress21 or they attempt to measure 
hedge fund leverage22 and illiquidity exposure.23
There is also some information collected by 
supervisors, as some of them have launched 
regular data collection on prime brokers’ exposures
to hedge funds (e.g. the UK FSA’s semi-annual 
surveys of selected prime brokers on their largest 
exposures to hedge funds). Supervisors may opt to 
disclose their ﬁ  ndings in an aggregate form, but the 
bank-level information collected would remain 
available only to supervisors, as is the usual 
practice for all ﬁ  rm-speciﬁ   c supervisory data. 
Public reporting by banks of their direct exposures 
to hedge funds is essentially non-existent, although 
enhanced transparency was seen as one of the main 
measures to improve counterparty discipline after 
the near-default of LTCM.24
Besides regular information-gathering from banks, 
public authorities may also initiate thematic surveys
on banks’ dealings with hedge fund clients. In 2005, 
for example, the Banking Supervision Committee of 
the European System of Central Banks conducted 
a survey on large EU banks’ exposures to hedge 
funds, which provided encouraging as well as some 
worrisome information on banks’ risk management 
practices. Similar one-off projects provide snapshot 
quantitative information, but gleaned qualitative 
knowledge of prevailing market practices is very 
useful for guiding future analytical and policy work.
Finally, given the lack of frequent (daily or weekly) 
up-to-date information on hedge fund activities, 
market surveillance by the authorities responsible 
for the safeguarding of ﬁ   nancial stability is 
indispensable for monitoring, understanding and 
analysing hedge fund activities. It includes keeping 
a watchful eye on price developments in ﬁ  nancial 
markets, regular dialogues with market participants 
and, in particular, contacts with prime brokers and 
hedge fund managers. Market surveillance is also the 
key way to learn about hedge fund-related stressed 
conditions in ﬁ  nancial markets.
4| INDICATORS FOR MONITORING
HEDGE FUND RISKS
TO FINANCIAL STABILITY
After reviewing the various information sources 
available for analysing hedge fund activities, the next 
logical step is to identify a set of pertinent indicators 
which could be useful for ﬁ  nancial stability analysis. 
Taking into account the channels through which 
possible negative effects of hedge fund activities on 
ﬁ  nancial stability could materialise, three groups 
of indicators could be suggested to measure and 
monitor:
• endogenous hedge fund vulnerabilities, which could 
lead to difﬁ  culties or a failure of a large hedge fund 
or a group of hedge funds with far-reaching 
repercussions for exposed banks and affected 
ﬁ  nancial markets. These internal vulnerabilities 
include funding liquidity risk, exposures to certain 
market risk factors and excessive leverage;
• banks’ exposures to hedge funds; and
• crowding (concentration) of hedge fund trades, when 
the number and size of one-way hedge fund positions 
are large relative to the amounts outstanding of 
underlying instruments and thereby markets 
18  The issues which are explored in such papers include biases in hedge fund data, hedge fund performance measurement, non-normality of return distributions, 
persistence, serial correlation, micro (fund-speciﬁ  c), market risk and macroeconomic factors of returns, diversiﬁ  cation properties, etc. See, for example, an overview 
of papers on hedge fund performance by Géhin (2006).
19  See, for example, Kundro and Feffer (2004); and Baba and Goko (2006).
20  See, for example, Eichengreen, Mathieson, Chadha, Jansen, Kodres and Sharma (1998).
21  See, for example, Chan, Getmansky, Haas and Lo (2005) and Garbaravičius and Dierick (2005) pp. 46-49 sub-section on the issue of crowded trades.
22  See McGuire, Remolona and Tsatsaronis (2005).
23  See Getmansky, Lo and Makarov (2004).
24  See The US President’s Working Group on Financial Markets (1999) and Financial Stability Forum (2000).ARTICLES
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become vulnerable to a possible simultaneous 
unwinding of such concentrated investments by a 
group of relatively homogenous investors.
4|1  Indicators of endogenous 
  hedge fund vulnerabilities
Indicators within this group would largely be based 
on information on the size and structure of hedge 
fund balance sheets. Since such information is 
not readily available from any publicly available 
information source, indirect methods would have 
to be devised to measure and monitor endogenous 
hedge fund vulnerabilities.
Funding liquidity risk is associated with the risk that 
a fund will not have sufﬁ  cient liquidity buffers to 
meet various liquidity requests and this, in turn, may 
force the hedge fund manager to resort to forced asset 
liquidations in possibly already frail ﬁ  nancial markets. 
Liquidity pressures may arise either from asset/liability 
mismatches related to short-term ﬁ  nancing provided 
by prime brokers or from investor redemptions. 
Information on ﬁ  nancing mismatches requires hedge 
fund balance sheet data, which, however, is not available.
By contrast, the structural vulnerability of the 
hedge fund sector to investor redemptions could be 
estimated by exploring the proﬁ  les of hedge fund 
redemption restrictions based on individual fund-
level data in hedge fund databases. Hedge funds 
apply various combinations of investor redemption 
restrictions, including initial lock-ups, penalties for 
early redemption, redemption frequency, redemption 
notice and payout periods that ideally should match 
the liquidity of the underlying investment portfolio. 
All of these redemption characteristics could be 
analysed by aggregating and comparing them by 
strategy (in order to evaluate whether redemption 
restrictions are adequate given strategy’s risk proﬁ  le, 
see Chart 2), by fund vintage year (see Chart 3) or 
in some other way (see Chart 4) in order to obtain 
some idea of the prevailing trends.
Information on hedge fund investor structure is 
also not available, although estimates of the share 
of capital provided by funds of hedge funds (FoHFs) 
could be constructed by comparing estimates of 
their capital under management to the capital of 
single-manager funds. Like banks, FoHFs perform 
a maturity transformation function when they offer 
their investors more favourable redemption terms 
than underlying single-manager funds, and this 
feature should be taken into account when analysing 
the funding liquidity risk faced by FoHFs.
Since information on investor gross ﬂ  ows is not 
available, historical aggregate investor activity by 
Chart 2
Hedge fund redemption frequency by strategy




















































Source: Lipper TASS database (27 September 2006 version).
Note: The directional group includes long/short equity hedge, global macro, 
emerging markets, dedicated short bias and managed futures strategies. The 
market-neutral group consists of convertible arbitrage, ﬁ  xed income arbitrage 
and equity market-neutral strategies. FoHFs stands for funds of hedge funds.
Chart 3
Single-manager hedge fund 
redemption frequency and capital by vintage year
(December 2005; % of capital under management; distribution of redemption 
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Source: Lipper TASS database (27 September 2006 version).
Note: Only funds launched before 2006.ARTICLES
Lucas D. Papademos: “Monitoring hedge funds: a ﬁ  nancial stability perspective”
Banque de France • Financial Stability Review – Special issue on hedge funds • No. 10 • April 2007  121
strategy can be obtained by summing separately net 
ﬂ  ows of funds that have experienced net outﬂ  ows 
or net inﬂ  ows.25 Moreover, it is quite likely that 
aggregate net ﬂ  ows into the hedge fund sector may 
be dependent on macro-ﬁ  nancial factors.26 Hence, 
econometric models could be used to obtain more 
timely estimates or even forecasts of expected 
aggregate net ﬂ  ows on the basis of observable and 
measurable contemporaneous macro-ﬁ  nancial 
variables.
Little is known about hedge fund balance sheets and 
exposures to market risks and, therefore, it is difﬁ  cult 
to foresee how vulnerable hedge funds would be 
under different market scenarios. However, hedge 
fund exposures to certain risk factors might be gauged 
indirectly by applying econometric techniques 
(e.g. regression methods) or by aggregating qualitative 
information in hedge fund databases for the markets 
and assets hedge funds tend to trade in.27
In the case of regression methods, moving time windows 
must contain a certain minimum amount of return 
observations in order to allow the estimation of market 
risk factor loadings. As a result, these estimates would 
represent moving time window averages rather than 
the desired end-of-period information. Nevertheless, 
the direction of coefﬁ  cient changes could be used as 
an indication of portfolio shifts. Similar difﬁ  culties 
are experienced by the creators of synthetic hedge 
fund return replication products aimed at providing 
hedge fund-like returns more cheaply by investing in 
traditional liquid assets. It remains to be seen what 
impact the recent wave of these products will have on 
hedge fund fees and the sector itself.
Another limitation of indirect approaches based 
on time series analysis of hedge fund returns is 
that hedge funds typically report their returns net 
of all fees, whereas an accurate regression-based 
estimation would require information on gross 
returns. Automated transformation of individual 
hedge funds’ returns net of all fees to original 
gross returns would probably be very complicated 
due to complex hedge fund fee structures, 
involving management and performance fees, high 
watermarks, hurdle rates and possibly other hedge 
fund-speciﬁ  c arrangements.
Leverage represents the third endogenous 
vulnerability, since it ampliﬁ  es the impact of price 
swings on investment return and, therefore, may lead 
to involuntary and swift closures of market positions 
or even to the depletion of investors’ capital. As in 
the case of investor redemption restrictions, some 
indication of characteristic leverage levels and their 
possible changes over time could be obtained from 
hedge fund databases by examining distributions of 
provided static leverage measures by strategy and by 
vintage year.
Moreover, leverage might also be assessed indirectly 
by utilising the same econometric methods used 
for estimating hedge fund exposures to various 
market risk factors. In this case, the total elasticity 
of returns to market risk factors could be interpreted 
as an indicator of pertinent leverage,28 although, 
here again, the same limitations encountered in 
estimating hedge fund exposures would apply too.
4|2  Indicators of banks’ exposures 
  to hedge funds
Except for supervisory data or one-off thematic 
surveys, information on banks’ exposures to hedge 
fund clients is scarce, because banks disclose very 
little information about their prime brokerage 
Chart 4
Evolution of single-manager hedge fund 
redemption frequency
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Source: Lipper TASS database (27 September 2006 version).
25  See ECB (2006b), pp. 43-44.
26  See ECB (2006a), pp. 139-142, Box 17 on global search for yield and funding liquidity risks for hedge funds.
27  See ECB (2006b), pp. 50-51.
28  For details, see McGuire, Remolona and Tsatsaronis (2005).ARTICLES
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operations. Since a large proportion of hedge funds 
were and remain domiciled in offshore centres, the 
BIS data on consolidated bank claims on private 
non-bank borrowers in offshore centres could have 
been used for making some inferences on banks’ 
exposures to hedge funds. However, these claims 
on non-banks may increasingly include claims 
on special purpose vehicles and other non-hedge 
fund entities domiciled offshore, which makes 
such information less relevant for the analysis of 
banks’ links with hedge funds.
Another way of gauging banks’ exposures could be 
to employ commercial hedge fund databases that 
provide information on prime brokers used by 
individual hedge funds. In order to estimate the 
risk proﬁ  le of prime brokers’ hedge fund clients, 
characteristics of connected hedge funds could be 
aggregated, for example, by their strategy, size, 
leverage or return volatilities.29 Such mapping of the 
prime brokerage market could be used as a ﬁ  rst step 
towards closer scrutiny of prime brokers’ exposures 
to hedge funds and could allow the detection of 
possible prime brokers’ concentrations on certain 
hedge fund strategies or other factors that could 
make them vulnerable to dislocations in certain 
ﬁ  nancial markets.30
Banks’ agreements on conducting business with 
hedge funds often include provisions for net asset 
value (NAV) decline triggers, which allow banks to 
terminate transactions with a particular hedge fund 
and seize the collateral held if a fund’s NAV declines 
substantially31 and the risk of a fund’s failure or 
closure increases. The proportion of hedge funds in 
a database breaching such triggers may provide an 
indication of how widespread historically were risks 
for prime brokers owing to difﬁ  culties experienced 
by their hedge fund clients.
4|3  Indicators of risk posed 
 to  ﬁ  nancial markets
A key risk posed by hedge fund activities to ﬁ  nancial 
markets is related to the possibility of abrupt 
collective hedge fund exits from crowded trades, 
which, however, is not conﬁ  ned only to hedge 
funds. Therefore, its monitoring would require 
detailed information gathering and reporting of large 
exposures by a broader range of market participants, 
including banks. 
Nonetheless, there are some indirect ways of 
estimating this potential risk. For example, higher 
pairwise correlations of hedge fund returns within 
an investment strategy could be interpreted as a 
symptom of increasingly similar investment positions 
across hedge funds pursuing that strategy, although it 
could also be an indication of the strategy’s capacity 
constraints.32 However, such estimations would not 
be sufﬁ  ciently timely and it would not be clear which 
markets are at risk given the lack of information on 
hedge fund exposures.
5| MAIN INFORMATION GAPS
AND SOME POSSIBLE WAYS
TO ADDRESS THEM
Comparisons of what is desirable for ﬁ  nancial stability 
monitoring purposes and what is actually available 
highlight the existence of important information 
gaps which hinder reliable assessment. Given the 
information available, most indicators for ﬁ  nancial 
stability analysis need to be developed “bottom-up” 
by using individual hedge fund data in commercial 
hedge fund databases, which makes such indicators 
susceptible to the widely known deﬁ  ciencies of 
such databases. Furthermore, most quantitative 
information either in hedge fund databases or from 
other sources is available with considerable time lags 
relative to monitoring needs and it is not available as 
time series. Only hedge fund returns, capital under 
management and investor net ﬂ  ows, derived from 
the latter two, are available as monthly or quarterly 
time series.  
All in all, there is no reliable and timely publicly 
available information on endogenous hedge fund 
vulnerabilities, banks’ exposures to hedge funds 
29  However, aggregation is complicated by the fact that hedge fund managers indicate the names of different entities within the prime broker’s group, and, therefore, the 
group’s structure has to be taken into account. Moreover, future updates of such information have to consider mergers and acquisitions between prime brokers too.
30 See  Garbaravičius and Dierick (2005), pp. 38-41.
31  NAV decline triggers are often calculated on a monthly, rolling 3-month and rolling 12-month basis with corresponding frequently used NAV decline triggers of 15%, 
25% and 40%. See also ECB (2006b), pp. 102-103.
32 See  Garbaravičius and Dierick (2005), pp. 46-49 sub-section on the issue of crowded trades.ARTICLES
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and crowded trades. The monitoring and evaluation 
of hedge fund activities for the ﬁ  nancial stability 
assessment would beneﬁ  t enormously from better 
aggregate information on hedge fund activities, 
particularly with respect to their off- and on-balance 
sheet positions. Even basic aggregate information 
on total balance sheets and their breakdowns would 
make a signiﬁ  cant contribution to the construction 
of the indicators proposed.
However, after identifying desirable information 
and checking it against available data for remaining 
information gaps, it is still not obvious how this 
enhanced transparency could be achieved, i.e. who 
(banks or hedge funds) could be asked to provide 
more and better information, to whom it should 
be provided (to the public or conﬁ  dentially  to 
supervisors, who would then disclose aggregated 
information publicly) and the details of what exactly 
should be reported. The answers to these questions go 
beyond the scope of this article, but they presumably 
will emerge after the ongoing global discussions on 
hedge fund transparency address these practical 
issues.
Proposals should include input from the private 
sector, foremost hedge funds and prime brokers, and 
would preferably take the following three elements 
into account:
• First, any disclosure enhancements should aim at 
making more aggregate information available to all 
market participants. The aggregation of individual 
hedge fund disclosures should alleviate hedge funds’ 
concerns that too much transparency may adversely 
affect their trading strategies. In this context, it is 
useful to bear in mind that weekly public information 
on open positions in exchange-traded derivatives 
has not been harmful; on the contrary, has proven 
very useful for various market participants. Another 
notable example relates to mandatory and publicly 
available 13-F ﬁ  lings of long holdings of equity 
securities publicly traded in the US by managers 
of large equity portfolios (having an aggregate fair 
market value of at least USD 100 million) with the 
US Securities and Exchange Commission.
•  Second, it is important that any reporting on 
hedge fund activities would be done by using a 
highly standardised template in order to ensure 
meaningful comparisons and easy aggregation 
across strategies and countries. Nevertheless, it 
may prove challenging to devise such a template, 
not least given the diversity of hedge fund strategies 
and risk proﬁ  les.
• Finally, in order to have a complete picture of 
risks to the smooth functioning of ﬁ  nancial markets 
and ensure a level playing ﬁ  eld, banks and other 
highly leveraged institutions (HLIs) would ideally 
report similar information (if not already available) 
together with hedge funds, and such information 
would also be included in regular (e.g. quarterly) 
publicly available aggregate statistics.ARTICLES
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Alternative investment vehicles may require alternative monitoring approaches for ﬁ  nancial stability 
purposes. Hedge funds provide a typical example of this. Most quantitative information, which is usually 
obtained from hedge fund databases or quarterly industry reports, is available at time lags and frequencies 
which do not meet monitoring needs, and is unavailable as time series. Bilateral disclosures to investors on 
investment terms and to both banks and investors on risk proﬁ  les need to be timely and sufﬁ  cient in order 
to effectively contribute to risk management and counterparty discipline. Such disclosures are reportedly 
improving, partly in response to demands from institutional investors. There is, however, insufﬁ  cient public 
information on hedge fund risk proﬁ  les. Without sufﬁ  cient publicly available information, the monitoring of 
hedge fund activities from the ﬁ  nancial stability perspective by public authorities becomes a major challenge. 
Such monitoring is of importance given that prime brokers’ and investors’ risk appetite may vary substantially 
owing to competitive pressures and ﬁ  nancial market conditions, and a weakening of counterparty discipline 
cannot be excluded. The aggregation of individual hedge fund data for public reporting purposes should 
alleviate hedge funds’ concerns about the conﬁ  dentiality of their proprietary trading strategies.
Most of the remaining information gaps could be addressed through better information on hedge fund 
balance sheets, which could signiﬁ  cantly advance the monitoring of hedge fund activities for the assessment 
of ﬁ  nancial stability by improving the quality of indicators relating to endogenous hedge fund vulnerabilities, 
to banks’ exposures to hedge funds and to crowded trades. Such information would usefully complement 
the information obtained by public authorities through their market surveillance and would enhance the 
analysis of prevailing trends and the potential build-up of vulnerabilities.ARTICLES
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